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THE DOCTRINE OF CONTINUOUS VOYAGES.
In a recent authoritative American work on international law
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of the Springbok is characterized as a "new and dangerous
extension of the doctrine of continuous voyages which received from
the publicists of the world outside of the United States, general and
emphatic condemnation." Even conceding that the facts were as
found by the court, the author says that the decision rested upon
reasons which were subject to well grounded objections, and quotes
with approval the language of Lawrence that, "if a belligerent may
capture a neutral vessel honestly intended for a neutral port and
condemn her cargo because he vaguely suspects it will be transferred
to some vessel unknown to him, and sent on to some hostile destina-
tion also unknown to him, a new disability has been imposed upon
neutral commerce." 1
Mr. Taylor's treatment of this important subject seems very
inadequate, as he completely ignores the subsequent history of the
doctrine, and leaves the reader to infer that the rule to which this
country gave its adherence is now discredited before the world.
I do not intend in this brief article to discuss the merits of the
doctrine of continuous voyages as applied during our civil war, but
merely to disclose its subsequent history and show that the matter
is not so simple and one-sided as Mr. Taylor's excellent book would
leave us to infer. A doctrine of international law which
the great maritime powers of Great Britain, the United States,
France2 and Italy have advocated and actually enforced against
'Taylor's International Law, pp. 778, 779 (1goi).
'I include France because of her action during the war with China in
1885. French writers on international law generally condemn the entire
doctrijie of continuous voyages, as was done by American statesmen when it
was first worked out by the British courts in the early part of the nineteenth
century. See 3 American State Papers (For. Relations), io6, i8. Spec.
Messages Pres. Jefferson, Jan. 17, i8o6; Mess., & Papers of the Presidents
(Richardson), Vol. 1, p. 395.
The reader interested in the antagonistic views of neutral rights is referred
to Des Droits et des Devoirs des Nations Neutres en temp de guerre maratime,
by Hautefauille, a review of his theories by Sir Vernon Harcourt (Historicus),
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neutrals, and which has been approved by an international com-
mission, cannot properly be thus brushed aside, because in the judg-
ment of learned jurists, it is not theoretically sound.3
It is true that the Springbok decision raised a storm of criticism
and met with the general disapproval of European writers on inter-
national law. But so far as known the men who are immediately
responsible for the action of governments have not joined in this
chorus. Recent applications of the doctrine make it apparent that
belligerents will not permit neutrals to escape responsibility for the
violation of blockades or carrying contraband goods to the enemy
by the nominal and fraudulent interposition of a neutral port. What
is forbidden by the law will not be permitted to be done by indi-
rection, and the cries of the victims caught in the act of violating
the law will. not receive much consideration. Like the ordinary
dealer in contraband articles he will have to take his chances and
carry his own insurance.
The subject is liable to become important in the near future.
If China should become involved in the war now raging in the far
East the geographical conditions are such as to inevitably raise
the question of the application of the doctrine of continuous voy-
ages. The location of Hong Kong will again make it an extremely
convenient intermediate "neutral" port as during the Franco-Chinese
war in 1885.
The doctrine of continuous voyages was developed by the Eng-
lish courts in the early part of the last century to meet the devices
by which it was sought to avoid the rule of the war of 1756, which
forbade neutrals in time of war to engage in a commerce from which
they were excluded during peace. A neutral vessel might lawfully
sail from a neutral port to a non-blockaded port of a belligerent with
goods not contraband of war, and the simple device of interposing
a neutral port between the forbidden colonial port and the bellig-
erent port of ultimate destination suggested itself to the enterprising
carriers. As trade between the colonies in America and between
"Letters" (i863) and comments on the latter work by Mr. F. W. Payne in
an essay on "Neutral Trade in Arms and Ships," in a volume entitled
"Cromwell on Foreign Affairs" (London), sgoI.
In an article on Theorie du Voyage, Continu, in Revue Gen. de droit
International and Public, t. IV, p. 297 (1897), M. Paul Fauchille condemns
the whole doctrine and calls for an international congress to consider the
revision of the law.
"Prof. Moore (Int. Arb., Vol. i, p. 695), and Dr. Wharton (Int. Law
Dig., Vol. III, 362), suggest that the brief of Mr. Evarts was not filed in
time to receive due consideration by the commission.
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America and Europe was permitted, the Yankee skippers merely
sailed from a colonial port to an American port, and from thence
to Europe, and claimed exemption during the latter part of the
voyage. The British courts met this evasion of the rule by holding
that the two voyages were in fact one continuous voyage, unless the
goods passed into the common stock of the country to which they
were first carried. Naturally this rule did not meet with the ap-
proval of the neutrals who were thus deprived of a valuable carry-
ing trade which was open to them. But while Americans were
particularly energetic in their manifestation of disapproval, their
objections were of no avail, and the rule was thoroughly established
that "when the ultimate destination of a ship or cargo is such as to
infringe belligerent rights, the offending ship cannot escape by
stopping at an intermediate neutral port."
This doctrine was announced by Sir William Grant, afterward
Lord Stowell, in judgments which have been acquiesced in as es-
tablishing restrictions that may reasonably be imposed by a bellig-
erent upon a neutral commerce.
(i8o6.) The William, 3 Rob. 385, Snow, 505. This is
a leading case. A cargo taken on board at La Guayra was
brought to Marblehead, where it was landed and then re-em-
barked in the same vessel with the addition of some sugar, and
within a few days thereafter sent to Bilboa, Spain. The vessel
and cargo were condemned by Sir William Grant, who said,
"The truth may not always be discernible, but when it is dis-
covered it is according to the truth and not according to the
fiction that we are to give the transaction its character and
denomination."'
After the close of the Napoleonic wars no occasion arose for
the application of the rule until 1855. During the Crimean War
France condemned the cargo of the Dutch ship Vrow Horwi na,
which was captured while carrying saltpetre from Lisbon to the
neutral port of Hamburg, to be from there carried overland into
Russia. The hostile destination was inferred from various cir-
cumstances-such as that Hamburg -was already overstocked with
saltpetre, and that there was hence no local commercial demand for
a further supply of that necessary ingredient of gunpowder. The
cargo was condemned by the French Council of Prizes, in a judg-
"Mr. Hall, International Lazu, p. 695, says, "In this and in like cases the
English courts condemn the property; but they were careful not to condemn
it until what they conceived to be the hostile act was irrevocably entered upon;
the cargo was confiscated only when captured on its voyage from the port of
colonial importation to the enemy country."
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ment which is commended by Calvo and printed in full in his work
on International Law.' During the Civil War the United States
invoked the same rule for the purpose of checking violations of the
blockade as well as carrying of contraband goods to the Confed-
erates. A blockade runner, by well established British and Amer-
ican rules, was subject to capture as soon as she had left her for-
eign port with the intention of running the blockade, and English
boats loaded with goods destined for the Confederates were thus
imperiled during the entire voyage across the Atlantic. But by
clearing for the British port of Nassau, and there trans-shipping
the goods to more suitable vessels, the danger line was brought to
within a few miles of the blockaded coast. A barren rock in the
Bahamas thus became a great commercial port. Its harbor swarmed
with innocent looking neutral trading vessels, and the United States
government was expected to presume that they had no relations with
the rakish craft of race-horse build that frequently called at that
busy port. The truth known to every one was that the whole trade
was a manifest and palpable evasion of a recognized and admitted
rule of maritime law. Nassau was a mere outpost for attack, a
resting place while hovering off the coast and awaiting the arrival
of a stormy night suitable for a dash to some convenient port.
In a series of prize cases the United States courts held that
where the interposition of a neutral port was a mere pretence, the
voyage was continuous, and that the vessel and cargo, or merely the
cargo, depending upon the circumstances of each case, subject to
condemnation.
(1863.) The Stephen Hart, Blatchf. Prize Cas. 387, 3 Wall.
559, (1865). In this case the principle applied in a series of
cases was given careful consideration by Judge Betts. The
vessel was captured on Jan. 29th, 1862, off the coast of Flor-ida about twenty-five miles from Key West and about eighty-
two miles from Point de Yeacos, Cuba, bound ostensibly from
London to Cuba, with a cargo consisting entirely of munitions
of war and army supplies. It was thus a case of carrying con-
traband. The government contended and was able to show
that the cargo was composed entirely of articles of contraband
of war, destined when they left London to be delivered to
the enemy either directly or by being carried into a part of the
enemy country by the Stephen Hart, or by being trans-shipped
at Cardenas to another vessel; that Cardenas was to be used
merely as a port of call for the Stephen Hart or as the port of
trans-shipment of the cargo; that the vessel and her cargo were
'Calvo, International Law (5th ed.), t. V., p. 5o. See also Revue de
Droit, Int., t. XXIX, p. 55.
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equally involved in the forbidden transaction, and that the
papers of the vessel were simulated and fraudulent in respect
to her true destination and that of her cargo.
"It would scarcely seem possible," said Judge Betts, "that
there could be any serious debate as to the true principles of
law applicable to the questions thus presented; in fact the
law is so well settled as to make it only necessary to see
whether the facts in this case bring the vessel and her cargo
within the rules which have been laid down by the most eminent
authorities in England and this country. * * * The law
seeks out the truth and never in any of its branches tolerates
any such fiction as that under which it is sought to shield the
vessel and her cargo in the present case. If a guilty intention
that the contraband goods should reach the port of the enemy
existed when such goods left their English port, that guilty
intention could not be obliterated by the innocent intention of
stopping at a neutral port on the way. If there be in stop-
ping at such port no intention to trans-ship the cargo, and if it
is to proceed to the enemy's country in the same vessel in which
it comes from England, of course there can be no purpose of
neutral commerce at a neutral port by the sale or use of the
cargo in the market there; and the sole purpose of stopping
at the neutral port must be merely to have upon the papers
of the vessel, an ostensibly neutral terminus for the cargo. If,
on the other hand, the object of stopping at the neutral port be
to trans-ship the cargo to a neutral vessel to be transported to
the port of the enemy, while the vessel in which it was brought
from England does not proceed to the port of the enemy, there
is equally an absence of all lawful commerce at the neutral port;
and the only commerce carried on in the case is that of the
transportation of the contraband cargo from the English port
to the port of the enemy as was intended when it left the Eng-
lish port. This court holds that in all such cases the transporta-
tion or voyage of the contraband goods is to be treated as a
unit from the port of delivery in the enemy's country; that if
any part of such voyage or transportation be unlawful, it is
unlawful throughout; and that the, vessel and her cargo are
subject to capture; as well before arrival at the first neutral
port at which she touched after her departure from England,
as on the voyage or transportation by sea from such neutral
port to the port of the enemy." Both vessel and cargo were
condemned.
(1864.) The Circassian. 2 Wall. (U. S.) 135. The
British steamer, Circassian, was captured while on an ostensi-
ble voyage from Bordeaux to the neutral port of Havana. No
art of the cargo was contraband, but the ship and cargo were
oth condemned for intent to run the blockade of the port of
New Orleans. It was held that evidence of an intent to run the
blockade might be collected from bills of lading of the cargo,
from letters and papers found on board the vessel, from acts
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and words of the owners or hirers of the vessel and shippers
of the cargo and their agents, and from spoliation of the papers
on apprehension of capture. The chief justice said: "We
agree that if the ship had been going to Havana with the honest
intent to ascertain whether the blockade of New Orleans yet
remained in force, with a design to proceed further if such
should prove to be the case, neither ship nor the cargo would
have been subject to lawful seizure, but it is manifest that such
was not the intent. The existence of the blockade was known
at the inception of the voyage, and its discontinuance was not
expected. The vessel was chartered and her cargo shipped with
the purpose of running the blockade and the destination to
Havana was merely colorable."
(1865.) The Bermuda, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 514, 554. In this
case it was held that a ship carrying contraband of war intended
for the enemy is not saved by stopping or by trans-shipping
her cargo at a neutral port, "unless there be an honest intention
to bring them into the common stock of the country" where
trans-shipped. Paying duties at a neutral port is not a defense.
(1866.) The Peterhoif, Blatchf. Prize Cas. 463, 5 Wall.
(U. S.) 28, 58; Snow, p. 465. This case presented another
phase of the doctrine of continuous voyages. The vessel was
bound for the neutral port of Matamoras on the Rio Grande in
Mexico, with a cargo which consisted in part of contraband
articles intended for the use of the Confederate army. The
question of blockade does not enter into the case. The district
court condemned the ship and cargo, but on appeal the supreme
court released the vessel and condemned the cargo. "While
articles not contraband," said Chief Justice Chase, "might
be sent to Matamoras and beyond to the rebel regions where
the communications were not interrupted by blockade, articles
of a contraband nature destined in fact to a state in rebellion,
or for the use of the rebel military forces, were liable to capture,
though primarily destined for Matamoras."
(I866.) The Springbak, Blatchf. Prize Cases, p. 349, 5
Wall. (U. S.) i. The British owned bark Springbok sailed
from London, December 8. 1862. and was captured by a
United States vessel of war on February 3d, 1863, about one
hundred and fifty miles east of the British port of Nassau on
the Island of New Providence. This port was near the
southern coast of the United States, and it was a matter of
common knowledge that it had been largely used as one for
the call and trans-shipment of cargoes intended for the ports
of the insurrectionary States of the Union, then under blockade
by the federal government. The vessel was brought into the
port of New York, and after a hearing in the United States
district court, both vessel and cargo were condemned.
On appeal to the supreme court of the United States, the
vessel was released, but the decree of the lower court as to the
cargo was affirmed.
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The ship's papers were on their face regular, and it was
said by Chief Justice Waite, "they all showed that the voyage
on which she was captured was from London to Nassau, both
neutral ports within the definition of neutrality furnished by
international law. The shippers, too, were really genuine and
there was no concealment of any of them and no spoliation.
The owners were neutrals and do not appear to have any
interest in the cargo. There is no sufficient proof that they
had any knowledge of its alleged unlawful destination."
Our present interest is in the sufficiency of the evidence to
establish an intent to run the blockade. A portion of the cargo
was general merchandise and not contraband of war, but a
large part consisted of articles especially fitted for military use,
and a still larger part was capable of being adapted to such
use. Thus, among other things found in certain packages
the contents of which were not disclosed by the bills of lading,
there was found five hundred and forty pairs of gray army
blankets, like those used in the United States army; two hun-
dred and four pairs of white blankets; three hundred and sixty
gross of brass navy buttons, marked "C. S. N."; ten gross of
army buttons marked "A."; three hundred and ninety-seven
gross of army buttons marked "I."; one hundred and forty
gross of army buttons marked "C." All the buttons were
stamped on their under side, "Isaac Campbell, 71 Jermyn St.,
London." There were also eight cavalry sabres having the
British crown on their guards, eleven sword bayonets, nine
hundred and ninety-two pairs of army boots, ninety-seven
pairs of russet brogans, and forty-seven pairs of cavalry' boots.
The bills of 'lading disclosed the contents of six hundred
and nineteen out of two thousand and seven packages, and
both that and the manifest made the cargo deliverable to order.
The master being directed by his letter of instructions to
report himself on arrival at the neutral port to H., "who would
give orders as to the delivery of the cargo." It also appeared
that other vessels owned by the owners of the cargo and by
the charterer of the vessel, and sailing ostensibly for neutral
ports, were on invocation shown to have been engaged in
blockade running, many packages on one of the vessels, and
numbered in a broken series of numbers finding many of the
complemental numbers on the Springbok. No application was
made to take further proof in explanation of these facts, and
the claim of the cargo, libelled at New York, was not personally
sworn to by either of the persons owning it, resident in England,
but was sworn to by the agent in New York on information
and belief.
After holding that the vessel was not liable to condemna-
tion, Chief Justice Waite said: "If the real intention of the
owners was that the cargo should be landed at Nassau and
incorporated by real sale into the common stock of the island
it must be restored, notwithstanding this, misconduct.
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What then, was this real destination? That some other
destination than Nassau was intended might be inferred from
the fact that the consignment shown by the bills of lading, and
manifest, was to order or assign. Under the circumstances
of this trade already mentioned, such a consignment must be
taken as a negation that any sale had been made to any one at
Nassau. It must also be taken as a negation that any such
sale was intended to be made there; that had such sale been
intended, it is most likely that the goods would .have been con-
signed for that purpose to some established house named in
the bills of lading.
This inference is strengthened by the letter of Speyer &
Haywood to the master, when about to sail from London, for
the letter directs him to report to B. W. Hart, the agent of
the charterers at Nassau, and receive his instructions as to the
delivery of the cargo. The property in it was to remain un-
changed upon delivery. The agent was to receive it and exe-
cute the instructions of his principal. * * *
A part of it, small in comparison with the whole, consisted
of arms and munitions of war, contraband within the narrowest
definition. Another and somewhat larger portion consisted of
articles useful and necessary in war, and therefore contraband
within the construction of the American and English prize
courts. These portions being contraband, the residue of the
cargo belonging to the same owners must share their fate.
But we do not now refer to the character of the cargo for
the purpose of determining whether it is liable to condemnation
as contraband, but for the purpose of ascertaining its real
destination; for, we repeat, contraband or not, if really destined
for Nassau and not beyond; and contraband or not, it must
be condemned if destined to any rebel port, for all rebel ports
are under blockade.
Looking at the cargo with this view, we find that part of
it was specially fitted for use in the rebel military service, and
a larger-part, though not so specially fitted, was yet well adapted
to such use. * * * We cannot look at such a cargo as this
and doubt that a considerable portion of it was going to the
rebel States, where alone it could be used, nor can we doubt
that the whole cargo had one destination.
SNow if this cargo was not to be carried to its ultimate
destination by the Springbok (and the proof does not warrant
us in saying that it was), the plan must have been to send it
forward by trans-shipment, and we think it evident that such
was the purpose. We have already referred to the bills of
lading, the manifest and the letter of Speyer & Haywood as
indicating this intention; the same inference must be drawn
from the disclosures by the invocation, that Isaac Campbell
& Co. had before supplied military goods to the rebel authorities
by indirect shipments, and that Begbie was the owner of the
Gertrude and engaged in the business of running the blockade.
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If these circumstances were insufficient grounds for a satis-
factory conclusion, another may be found in the presence of
-the Gertrude in the harbor of Nassau with undenied intent to
run the blockade about the time when the arrival of the Spring-
bok was expected there. It seems to us extremely probable
that she had been sent to Nassau to await the arrival of the
Springbok and to convey her cargo to a belligerent blockaded
port, and that she did not so convey it only because the voyage
was intercepted by the capture.
All these condemnatory circumstances must be taken in
connection with the fraudulent concealment attempted in the
bills of lading and the manifest, and with the very remarkable
fact that not only has no application been made by the claimants
for leave to take further proof in order to furnish some ex-
planation of these circumstances, but that no claim, sworn to
personally, by either of the claimants, has ever been filed.
Upon the whole case we cannot doubt that the cargo was
originally shipped with the intent to violate the blockade; that
the owners of the cargo intended that it should be trans-
shipped at Nassau into some vessel more likely to succeed in
reaching safely a blockaded port, than the Springbok: that
the voyage from London to the blockaded port was, as to the
cargo, both in law and in the intent of the parties, one voyage;
and that the liability to condemnation, if captured during any
part of that voyage, attached to the cargo from the time of
sailing."'
The owner of the condemned vessel sought relief at the hands
of the British government, and March 13, 1863, the Foreign Office
was advised by Sir William Atherton, Sir Roundell Palmer, and
Dr. Phillimore that "there was nothing to justify the seizure of the
bark Springbok and her cargo, and that Her Majesty's government
would be justified in demanding immediate restitution of her cargo
without submitting to any adjudication of the American Prize
Courts." Sir Win. Harcourt and Mr. Mellish, afterward Lord Jus-
tice, also gave an opinion in which it was said, "that in a case where
the ship itself is really and. bona fide destined for a neutral port
(and that is here admitted to be the case) the onus of proof lies
on the captors, and they ought to give clear and conclusive evidence
to justify the inference that the cargo itself has a different destina-
tion. The Supreme Court have in their judgment justly stated that
the real question on which the condemnation must turn is the original
destination of the cargo, but when we come to examine the grounds
upon which the court found a conclusion adverse to the cargo, we
'The general rule was recognized in The Pedro, 175 U. S. 354 (899), but
it was held not to apply to the facts of the case.
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find that those grounds were, many of them, inaccurate in fact
and erroneous in principle."
The claims were submitted to a commission provided for by
the treaty of Washington. This commission, composed of James
S. Fraser, representing the United States; Russell Gurney, repre-
senting Great Britain, and Count Corti, the Italian Minister to the
United States, awarded $5,065 damages for the detention of the
vessel from the date of the decree in the district court to the date of
her discharge by the supreme court, but unanimously disallowed
any claim for the condemnation of the cargo. It is interesting to
note that in the claimant's brief the rule as announced in the case
of the Bermuda was recognized as correct, and that the only ob-
jection to the judgment in the Springbok case was the insufficiency
of the evidence to justify the findings of fact.'
The doctrine as applied by the supreme court was thus rec-
ognized as sound by the United States and Great Britain and has
never since been questioned by either. Great Britain's acquiescence
in the American application of the doctrine is conclusively shown
by her action during the recent Boer war. Writing while the
war was in progress, Professor T. S. Woolsey said: "In spite of
the adverse opinions of some of the best British jurists, we must
expect the English government to seize all military supplies bound
to the Portuguese port of Lorenzo Mafques in Delagoa Bay, acting
on the presumption that it is the Boers who want them, and that
the shippers know it.""1
(1884.) Sir Travess Twiss. Belligerent Right on the
High Seas since the Declaration of Paris. Also 1877. Law
Mag. & Rev., Vol 3 (4 th Sec,) i.
This distinguished English jurist published two articles in
which vigorous attacks were made upon the decision of the
Springbok case. In speaking of the judgment of the Supreme
Court, he said: "Such a severe exposition of the law of block-
ade is not to be found upon record in any of the reported
judgments of the European Prize Courts, and it is not too
much to say that it added a new terror to war, and as regards
neutral commerce has also introduced a new ratio decidendi into
Prize Court proceedings, to which other nations may with
justice demur. * * * It may be presumed that the judges
of the Supreme Court of the United States did not foresee the
wide scope of interference with neutral commerce which the
'Moore, International Arbitrations, Vol. 4, p. 3930.
'T. S. Woolsey, Neutral Rights and Contraband of War, The Outlook,
Vol. 64, p. 164
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doctrine of blockade by interpretation would authorize and
that they overlooked the fact that no evidence can in the nature
of the case be forthcoming in the ship's papers or in the cargo's
papers to refute the suggestion of a possible re-shipment of the
cargo on board another vessel destined to a blockaded port
after it has been delivered at the port of the ship's actual des-
tination. Besides it is an axiom of maritime prize law that
with reference to the cargo on board, the general ship's manifest
and bills of lading are the best evidence of both ownership
and the destination of the cargo."
(i87o.) Prof. Montague Bernard, in his work entitled,
"The Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil
War," p. 320, says: "Not only was the rule severe, but it
was applied with severity. The evidence of an ulterior destina-
tion was in some cases slight. * * * It is probable that
all through the war very few cargoes were really intended
to be trans-shipped at Nassau; and that injustice would rarely
be done by acting on the assumption that the business of
southern traders or agents residing there was not so much to
make purchases on the spot as to forward the transmission of
goods from Europe. Yet, we cannot fail to see that if the
fact of an ulterior destination is to be considered as established
by evidence so slender as we find in some of these cases, neutral
traders and carriers may have to encounter serious risks and
hardships."
The same writer, in discussing the position of the neutral
trader, says: "It must, I think, be owned that while the rules
which have been gradually worked out by the prize courts of
Great Britain and America are not on the whole inequitable,
the application of these rules has sometimes been severe. The
excuse for this severity lies in the extreme facility with which
the rules themselves may be evaded. The jurisprudence of
prize courts is incessantly struggling with artifices and con-
trivances which are traditional, and resorted to in all maritime
wars, which are as easy to practice as they are difficult to
unmask,--artifices and contrivances by which neutral trade is
constantly struggling to escape the heavy pressure of war and
elude its restraints."
(1885.) Sir Robert Phillimore, International Law, 3rd ed..
p. 49o , says: "It seems to me, after much consideration and
with all respect to the high character of the tribunal, it is
difficult to support the decision of the majority of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of the Springbok, that
a cargo shipped for a neutral port can be condemned on the
ground that it was intended to trans-ship it at that port and
forward it by another vessel to be a blockaded port."
(0876.) Sir Edward Creasy in his First Platform of Inter-
national Law, p. 624, wrote: "In the administration of all
law, international as well as municipal, realities and not shams
are to be regarded. The artifice which is in fraud of a law is
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itself a breach of the law. Unquestionably there ought to be
a very full and clear proof of such artifice being practiced as
well as planned. The burden of proof necessarily lies on the
captors, who impute liability to seizure. Nay, more, the neutral
destination of the ship ought to be looked on as a presumptive
proof of the neutral destination of the cargo; and the evidence
on behalf of the captors to outweigh such presumption ought
to be very different in quality and amount from what it was
held sufficient in the case of the Springbok. But if full and
clear evidence is adduced that the contraband goods are not
destined for sale and consumption in the neutral market, but
that the direct and primary object of their shipment was to
forward them to or toward the enemy, then the belligerent
against whom they were destined to be used has a right to pro-
tect himself by arresting and seizing the intended instruments
of ill to him while they are on the seas, which are the highways
of all nations but the territories of none."
(1866.) Godfrey Lushington in the Manual of Naval
Prize, prepared for the use of the British navy, uses the fol-
lowing language: "Connected with the subject of contraband
is the important question of the mode of ascertaining the
destination of goods on board a vessel. In this volume it has
been treated as conclusively determined by the destination of
the vessel. This view is clearly to the interest of neutrals. On
the other hand, the interest of the belligerent when endeavoring
to intercept contraband goods from going to the enemy, is to
look to the goods. * * * Judged by principle, the view of
the belligerent seems correct. A neutral vessel which forwards
munitions of war on their way to their ultimate destination to
one of the belligerents is really aiding and abetting in the war,
and this on the high seas. This view is maintained by Halleck,
Duer, and Historicus, and was enforced by the Americans in
the cases of the Stephen Hart and the Commercen.
But the decision of the British courts, so far as they extend,
have been in the opposite direction. The view of the neutral
was supported in the case of the Hendric and the Alida, and
more recently in the case of Hobbs v. Henning. As to the
last case, however, it is to be observed that the judgment of the
court of common pleas was only upon the proceedings, and
apparently rests upon no other authority than that of Ortolan,
an avowed advocate of neutral rights, on an abstract theory
which is indifferent alike to positive decisions and general
practice."
(1893.) Sir Sherston Baker in his edition of Halleck's In-
ternational Law, Vol. 2, p. 219, says that, "The decision in the
case of the Springbok has been the subject of great discussion
among publicists. * * * The rule of the Supreme Court
of the United States has inflicted a serious blow on neutral
rights and is in conflict with the views generally expressed by
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the United States, and it is doubtful if it would be adopted
by the courts of Great Britain."
In his later work entitled "First Steps in International Law,"
p. 3o (1899), the same writer repeats this language in sub-
stance, and further states that, "It is a most unfortunate de-
cision. * * * Vessels are captured while on their voyage
from one neutral port to another, and were condemned not
for that they had done, which was prima facie innocent, but on
the suspicion of an intention to do an unlawful act."
(1893.) Walker, L A. Science of International La.z%, p.
514. "This doctrine was extended by its original British pro-
ponents, solely to breaches of the 'Rule of 1756,' and to cases
of fraudulent trade with the enemy on the part of British
subjects. During the American Civil Struggle, however, the
Supreme Court laid hold of the principle and applied it ex-
tensively to deal with the countless flight of the contraband
traders and blockade runners who found in Nassau and other
British West Indian harbors convenient intermediate stations
for the carrying on of their illegitimate commerce with the
Confederate ports. American cruisers captured many vessels
in the outward voyage from Europe and the American judges
made light of their professed destination to neutral ports.
* * * The newly forged weapon was wielded with sweeping
effect and goods susceptible of warlike use were freely con-
demned, though taken en route between neutral ports when
circumstances made it in any way probable that their ultimate
destination was the Confederate service. * * * This decision,
it is very evident, materially extended the risks of the neutral
trader in the interests of the belligerent, and it has accordingly
been made the subject of severe and not unmerited adverse
criticism at the hands of the supporters of neutral commerce."
Citing Rev. de Droit it. 1875, p. 241, and 1882, p. 328.
In the Manual of Public International Law, p. 209, by the
same author, published in 1895, there is found the following
reference to the opinion of Judge Betts in the case of the
Stephen Hart: "This judgment does indeed appear but to
represent a logical extension of the principle laid down by
Grant and Scott, but the doctrine so administered provides
the belligerent with a legal engine of immense power, and opens
up a wide vista of possible unjustifiable and oppressive re-
strictions of special branches of neutral industry and com-
merce."
(1895.) T. I. Lawrence, International Law, p. 597. "Put-
ting aside disputes as to fact, the statements of law involved in
the decision are open to grave doubt. If a belligerent may
capture a neutral vessel honestly intended for a neutral port,
and condemn her cargo because he vaguely suspects it will
be transferred to some vessel unknown to him, and sent on to
some hostile destination also unknown to him, a new disability
has been imposed upon neutral commerce. States at war will
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in the future be able to establish what has well been called a
blockade by interpretation, of any neutral port situated near
the coast of the enemy. * * * Its authority has been seri-
ously impaired by this chorus of disapproval. The utmost that
can be allowed, is that, if the captors have clear and definite
proof that the destination of the cargo is hostile, while that
of the vessel is neutral, the court may separate between the
two, and condemn the former while releasing the latter.
Further it is impossible to go without inflicting grave injustice
on neutral trade."
(1895.) Mr. Hall in the fourth edition of his well-known
work on International Law, p. 695, note, says: "By the Ameri-
can courts during the Civil War, the idea of a continuous
voyage was seized upon, and was applied to cases of contraband
and blockade. Vessels were captured while on their voyage
from one neutral port to another, and were then condemned
as carriers of contraband and for intent to break the blockade.
They were thus condemned, not for an act,---for the act done
was in itself innocent, and no previous act existed with which
it could be connected so as to form a noxious whole,--but on
the mere suspicion of intention to do an act. Between the
grounds upon which these and the English cases were decided
there was, of course, no analogy. The American decisions
have been universally reprobated outside the United States and
would probably now find no defenders in their own country."
It will thus be seen that the general consensus of opinion among
English writers is against the soundness of the doctrine as applied
in the Springbok case. Many writers of high authority like Hall
have characterized the particular decision with much warmth of
language and a liberal use of adjectives, but their denunciations
seem to have had no practical result upon the action of their govern-
ments. Practical statesmen have been impressed by the necessity
and reasonableness of the rule when enforced with a proper regard
for the real facts. Thus, Dr. Macdonnell, a late writer, says; "It
must be conceded that but for the theory of continuous voyages,
blockaders may be easily evaded in these days of developed railway
communication. None the less is a new chain on neutral commerce
forced by these decisions."1
The decision naturally received rough treatment at the hands
of many of the continental advocates of extreme neutral right, al-
though such writers as Calvo and Gessner admit that the doctrine
of continuous voyages may properly apply when it can be con-
clusively proven that contraband goods are destined for the enemy,
'Quoted in Snow's International Law, p. x59.
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and that the interposition of a neutral port was a mere subterfuge.'
I give a few illustrations:
(1882.) Paul Fauchille, Du Bleckus Maritime, No. 335,
ff. After speaking of the origin of continuous voyages, M.
Fauchille says: "This doctrine was pushed by the Supreme
Court of the United States so as to make it sustain the seizure
of a vessel between the port of original departure and an inter-
mediate neutral port, and this on the conjecture of an ulterior
adventure being projected for the goods in question from such
intermediate neutral port to a blockaded port. * * * The
effect of this decision is to impose on a voyage between two
neutral ports the penalties which may -be imposed on a voyage
between a neutral and a belligerent port. The decision stands
on the fiction that though the vessel in which the goods are to
be carried is changed at the intermediate port, yet the voyage
is the same; and the reason would apply, no matter how many
changes the goods might be subjected to, or how many succes-
sive neutral ports they might pass through. But international
law repudiates such fictions. International law being eminently
law based on common sense, the fiction in the present case m-
posed on neutral commerce irrationally onerous. It gives to
belligerent cruisers power over a neutral port greater and
more arbitrary than they possessed in respect'to belligerent
ports, since while neutrals can carry to non-blockaded ports
objects contraband of war, they cannot without risk of seizure
carry the same objects to another neutral port."
(1883.) Dr. Geffken in a note to Heffter's Le Droit Inter-
national de L'Europe, p. 379, note, says: "One does not know
how to protest energetically enough against such an illegal
and arbitrary rule."
(1869.) Dr. L. Gessner in an article in the Revue de Droit
International, Vol. VII, p. 236, says: "The doctrine, however,
upon which the Supreme Court of the United States has con-
demned the entire cargo of the Springbok, a neutral vessel
on her way to a neutral port is quite monstrous, more especially
as the court acquits that vessel of any intention to violate the
blockade. If such a doctrine were carried to its logical con-
clusions and enforced by a belligerent great maritime power as
rigorously as it has been by the United States, all neutral
property on the high seas might be treated as lawful prize of
war."
'As has been noted, Gessner gives a certain assent to the
principle of continuous voyages in his remarks on the con-
demnation of the Springbok by our courts. He says: "That
the capture can be justified even if the destination is a neutral
port if it can be proved beyond a doubt that the contraband of
war is destined for the enemy." See Woolsey, p. 357, with
'Calvo, Le Droit Int. (5th ed.), t. V, p. 43.
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
citation referring to Nord Deutsche Alleg. Zeit. of Dec. 29,
30, 1868.
(1186.) Fiori, International Lcow, Vol. 3, No. 1649 French
Ed. by Antoine. "Contraband goods destined for one belliger-
ent may be seized by the other belligerent if found on a neutral
ship sailing between neutral ports, if it be plain that the in-
tention was to supply the goods to the former belligerent. In
this sense the voyages of such goods are continuous, as they
constitute an indivisible unity as links in the same chain. But
this by itself would not justify the seizure of the vessel, but
only the seizure of such goods as are actually contraband and
no other.
(1884.) In January, 1884, a debate took place in the upper
Chamber of the States-General of the Netherlands in which
Count Van Lynder Van Sanderberg, Minister of State, said:
"It matters not who the owners of her cargo may be; to what
nationality they may belong, whether they are English, French,
Dutch, or even American. A great principle is at stake, and
the only satisfactory and conclusive proof that the United
States government can give that it at length abandons and
renounces a doctrine destructive of neutral trade, a judgment
pronounced in error, will be the awarding of full compensation
to the despoiled owners of the cargo, the long suffering victims
of a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Is it not the clear course,
is it not the duty of the Netherlands government, of the govern-
ment of the country which gave birth to Hugo Grotius, to
approach the United States of North America in conjunction
with the other maritime powers for the purpose of prevailing
on their government to retrace its steps? In my opinion this
is clearly our duty."
(1882.) The Institute of International Law. The mem-
bers of the Maritime Prize Commission in this learned body
(Arontz, Brussels; Asser, Netherlands; Bulmerincq, Germany;
Gessner, Germany; Hall, Great Britain; De Martins, Russia;
Prantoni, Italy; Renault, France; Rollins, Brussels; Twiss,
Great Britain), gave an opinion as to the juridical soundness
of the decision in the case of the Springbok, from which the
following quotation is made:
"That the theory of continuous voyages as we find it enun-
ciated and applied in the judgment of the Supreme Court of
the United States of America which condemned as good prize
of war the entire cargo of the British bark Springbok (1867),
a neutral vessel on its way to a neutral port, is subversive of
an established rule of the law of maritime warfare, according
to which neutral property on board a vessel under a neutral
flag whilst on its way to another neutral port is not liable to
capture or confiscation by a belligerent as lawful prize of war;
that the novel theory as before propounded whereby it is pre-
sumed that the cargo after having been unloaded in a neutral
port will have an ulterior destination to some enemy port.
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would aggravate the hindrances to which the trade of neutrals
is already exposed, and would, to use the words of Bluntschli,
'Annihilate such trade by subjecting the property to confisca-
tion, not upon proof of an actual voyage of the vessel and her
cargo to an enemy port, but upon the suspicion that the cargo
after having been unloaded at the neutral port to which the
vessel is bound, may be trans-shipped into some other vessel
and carried to some effectively blockaded enemy port.'
That the theory above propounded tends to contravene the
efforts of European powers to establish a uniform doctrine
respecting the rights of neutral nations, inasmuch as the fact
of the destination of a neutral vessel to a neutral port would no
longer suffice of itself to prevent the capture of goods non-
contraband on board.
That furthermore the result would be as regards blockade,
every neutral port to which a neutral vessel might be carrying
a neutral cargo, would become constructively a blockaded port,
if there were the slightest ground for suspecting that the cargo
after being unladen in such neutral port was intended to be
forwarded in some other vessel to some port actually blockaded.
We, the undersigned, are accordingly of the opinion that it
is extremely desirable that the government of the United States
of America, which has on several occasions been the zealous
promoter of important amendments of the rules of maritime
warfare in the interests of neutrals, should take an early oppor-
tunity of declaring in such form as it may see fit, that it does
not intend to incorporate the above propounded theory into
its system of maritime prize law, and that the condemnation of
the cargo of the Springbok shall not be adopted as a precedent
by its prize courts."'
(1888.) Charles Calvo, Le Droit International, etc. (5th
Ed.), t. v. p. 43.
Calvo reviews the Springbok case quite fully and gives
the views of the different writers who had expressed opinions
up to that time. He, like Harcourt and Gessner, expresses
a qualified approval of the doctrine as applicable where the
hostile destination is clearly made to appear.
At the meeting of the Association for the Reform and Codi-
fication of the Laws of Nations at Antwerp in 1877, Sir Francis
Twiss read a paper in which he called the learned world to arms
for the defense of neutral rights wounded in the house of its friends.
In response, Mr. J. C. Bancroft Davis, late United States Minister
to Germany, and for many years an official of the Department of
State, published at Paris in 1877, a learned brochure entitled Les
'Compare with the rule adopted in x896. Annuiare de 1'Institut de Droit
International, Vol. 15, p. 231, quoted infra.
'Printed in Law Mag. & Rev., Vol. 3 (4th Ser.), p.z. See also pamphlet
referred to supra.
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Tribunaux de Prises des Etats-Unis, which was a vigorous defense
of the general principles applied in the series of prize cases by the
United States courts. The gist of the whole matter is found in
his statement, "C'est simplement une question de preuves." If the
evidence is satisfactory and sufficient to prove that the goods are
destined for the belligerent port, and that the intervening neutral
port is a sham and a fraud the doctrine of continuous voyages may
fairly and reasonably be applied. In fact, many of the writers
who condemn the actual decision in the Springbok case admit that
there could properly have been a judgment of condemnation had
the evidence of hostile intent been sufficient. It would no longer
be questioned that the evidence should be conclusive and that a vessel
or cargo should not be condemned upon mere suspicion or upon
presumptions raised by insufficient facts. But circumstances are
sometimes more convincing than the testimony of witnesses. Res
ipsa loquitur.
But the decision was severely criticised by many American
writers, and Mr. Justice Nelson, one of the judges who decided
the Springbok case, with very questionable propriety, sent a letter
to Mr. W. B. Lawrence (the editor of Wheaton), in which he
stated "that the Supreme Court was not familiar with the law of
blockade at the time when the appeal in the case of the Springbok
came before it, and that the minds of several of the judges were
warped by patriotic sentiments and by resentment against England."'
But as said by Judge Baldwin in his inaugural address as President
of the International Law Association,--"Perhaps this particular
criticism is sufficiently answered by similar rulings which have been
made by the prize courts of France, and Italy, and the declaration
put forth by the Institute of International Law in 1896."
(1866.) Dana's note 231 to No. 508 of his edition of
Wheatoi's International Law.
"If the cargo is destined to be carried through a blockade
it can be captured at any stage of the voyage. A neutraldestination will often be interposed in such cases with all the
ceremonies of landing, trans-shipment, sale, etc., as in the case
of contraband, and the same test and principles of reasoning
apply to both. This subject has been fully and ably treatedby Mr. Harcourt (Historicus) in his pamphlet on the Nassau
'See this letter in Law Mag. & Rev. (4th Series), Vol. 3, P. 3, and
reference to it in Twiss' Belligerent Rights on the High Seas, P. 27, and
Hall's Int. Law, p. 695. For Lawrence's opinion on his letter of Sept. 30,
z873, to M. Rolin-Pacquemye, quoted in Law Mag. & Rev., supra, pp. 32, 34.
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Trade, published in 1883, pp. 33 to 40. If the only objection
to the cargo be its destination to be carried through the block-
ade, it is not enough to say that it was destined ultimately for
a blockaded port, if it was not to be landed at a port not
blockaded, whether enemy or neutral, and carried thence by
land to the blockaded port; that in that case there is not an
intent to carry the cargo through the blockade."
(i89o.) President Woolsey, International Law, 6th Ed.,
1890, p. 356, states the doctrine of continuous voyages as
originally announced and applied by Lord Stowell and subse-
quently extended by the American courts during the Civil War,
and adds that "It seems a natural extension of the English
principle of continuous voyages as at first given out; but there
is danger that the courts will infer an intention on insufficient
grounds. A still bolder extension was given to it in our courts
in the case of vessels and goods bound to the Rio Grande, the
goods then being carried by lighters to Matamoras. We could
not prohibit neutrals from sending goods to the Mexico side
of the river, but if it could be made to appear that the goods
were destined for a State belonging to the United States that
was held to be a sufficient ground for condemnation of them;
although in order to reach their destination they would go
overland carriage over neutral territory."
(1886.) Dr. Wharton in his International Law Digest,
Vol. 3, No. 362, p. 4o4, gives the case of the Springbok elaborate
consideration and in his concluding comments says: "The
decision in this case," so it was said by Bluntschli, who was
one of the most liberal and most accurate of modem publicists,
"has inflicted a more serious blow on neutral rights than did
all the orders in council put together."
As is shown by the prior note. the disapproval of this famous
decision so strongly expressed by Bluntschli, is shared with
more or less intensity by all the eminent publicists of Europe,
whose attention has been called to it, while even in English,
from whose precedents the decision was in part drawn, it is
treated by high authority as aiming an unjustifiable blow at
neutral rights. As to the opinion, the following remarks may
be made:
i. The opinion of the court has not that logical precision
which enables us to discover how far the question determined
involves the question of blockade. It cannot be clearly ascer-
tained from the opinion whether the goods confiscated were
held good prize because it was intended that they should run
the blockade of some particular blockaded Confederate port,
or because they were contraband destined for the belligerent
use of the Confederacy.
2. The decision was approved by a bare majority of the
court and among the dissenting judges was Mr. Justice Nelson,
whose knowledge of international law was not equalled by
that- of any of his associates, and Mr. justice Clifford, dis-
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tinguished as much for his strong sense as for his practice in
maritime cases. * * *
3. While the great body of foreign jurists, BritiSh as
well as continental, protested against the decision, it is not a
little significant to note that at the hearing before the com-
mission, the British commissioner united in the confirmation
of the decision. Down to this hearing it was understood that
the British government, acting under the advice of its law
officers, had disapproved of the condemnation..
4. The decision cannot be accepted without discarding
those rules as to neutral rights for which the United States
made war in 1812, and which except in the Springbok and
cognate cases the executive department of the United States
government, when stating the law, has since then constantly
vindicated. The first of these is that blockades must be of
specific ports. The second is, that there can be no confiscation
,of contraband goods owned by neutrals and in neutral ships on
the ground that it is probable that such goods may be at one
or more intermediate ports trans-shipped, or are trans-shipped
and then find their way to the port blockaded by the party
seizing.
5. The ruling is in conflict with the view generally ex-
pressed by the executive department of the government of the
United States, a department which is not merely a co-ordinate
authority in this respect of the judiciary, but is especially
charged with the determination of the law of blockades, so
far as concerns our relations with foreign states."
(1898.) Dr. Freeman Snow, Manual of International Law,
p. 159, in a course of lectures delivered at the Naval War
College and subsequently published by the government, states
the rule as it is undoubtedly understood by our government.
"There seems to be but little question that the evidence as to
tiie destination of the cargo should be definite. A presumption
should not be sufficient. In the case of the Springbok, although
only about one per cent. of the cargo could be held as con-
traband, yet, of that proportion there could be no doubt as to
its character."
(19O1.) Professor Theodore S. Woolsey in an article on
International Law in "Two Centuries' Growth of American
Law," p. 511, says, "'During the Civil War in America an
entirely new application was made of the principle above de-
scribed; namely, to check evasions of the rules governing
blockades and contraband. So far as the blockade was con-
cerned the new application was made principally at the Nassau
trade. Inasmuch as ships showing an intention to break the
blockade could be seized as soon as they had left a foreign
port, it was natural to hide this intention by sailing for some
neutral destination not much off their real course, to be safe
up to that point. In practice, however, the goods were there
usually trans-shipped and put on a regular blockade runner.
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The presumption of the court that the ship, which is the vehicle
of the offense in blockade violation (the goods implicated merely
following its fate) was engaged in one continuous voyage
whose terminus lay beyond the blockade lines, thus was apt
to break down. * * * But in the case of contraband where
it was the goods rather than the ship which was primarily guilty,
and where their adaptability to the Confederate service often
made their character clear, the continuous voyage principle was
fair enough, where intent as regards their eventual delivery
clung to them through the trans-shipment and sale."
After referring to the application of the principle in a
subsequent case, Professor Woolsey remarks that "it is interest-
ing to note how a theory somewhat duobtful at its origin has
been taken up from time to time and adapted to meet the
necessities of a belligerent, until it finally is accepted as law by
every one. In this process of growth in the history of the
doctrine of continuous voyages, the United States has played
an influential, perhaps a determining part."
In 1889 Boyd, in his edition of Wheaton, enjoined his readers
to bear in mind that these new rules are at present only the law
of the United States, and it remains to be seen whether they will
be adopted by other countries in the next maritime war." Time
seems to have cleared up the doubt.
The doctrine of continuous voyages as construed by the United
States, especially as applied to carrying -contraband goods, has
been recognized in subsequent cases and is now an established rule
of maritime law. It is interesting to note that the extremest form
of the rule has been most frequently approved by other countries.
President Woolsey called the case of the Peterhoff, in which goods
bound for Matamoras, to be hence carried by lighters into the
Confederacy by a non-blockaded port, a bolder extension of the
rule than the application to a vessel bound for blockaded ports.1
In 1885 the French government asserted the right to seize
vessels carrying contraband articles to China, between a neutral port
and the English port of Hong Kong.2
So in 1895, during the war between Italy and Abyssinia, the
doctrine was again applied to a cargo of contraband goods destined
on the surface to a neutral foreign port but with an evident ultimate
overland destination to a belligerent country. The Netherlands
steamer Doelwijk was captured in the Gulf of Aden by an Italian
vessel of war while carrying contraband goods ostensibly from the
"International Law (6th ed.), i8gi, 2o7.
'See article by Dr. Geffcken, China et Le Droit International, in Revue de
Droit International et de Leg. Comparee, Q. XVII, p. i49 (1885).
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neutral port of Rotterdam to British India. After leaving the Red
Sea the vessel had turned to the right toward Djibuti, a neutral
port from which the goods were to go overland into the belligerent
territory. The principle applied in the American cases was fully
recognized by the Italian government, although the ship and cargo
was released, as the war came to an end before the condemnation
could take place.'
As applied in this case the doctrine met with general approval
and was formally sanctioned by the Institute of International Law
at its meeting in Venice in 1896 by the adoption of the following
rule:
"La destination pour l'ennemi est presumee lorsque le transport
va a l'un de ses ports, ou bien a un port neutre qui, d'apres des
preuves evidentes et de fait incontestable, n'est qu' une etape pour
l'ennemi comme but final de la meme aperation commerciale." 1
There is no practical distinction between the Springbok and the
Doelwijk cases.
During the war between China and Japan the Japanese searched
the British mail steamer Gaelic in the harbor of Yokohama for
persons of the description of contraband or analagous of contraband,
seeking service and carrying to China material intended to be used
for the destruction of Japanese ships. At the time of the search
the persons had disembarked and proceeded on another ship to
Shanghai, but the search was continued for material which they
might have left on the vessel. The Gaelic was on a voyage from
San Francisco to Hong Kong by way of Yokohama, but the ves-
sels of the company to which it belonged often called at the Chinese
port of Amoy, but there was no proof of any intention to do so
on this voyage. The Japanese justified their acts on the ground
both of the probability that the Gaelic might call at Amoy and of
the doctrine of continuous voyages as applicable to contraband
persons or goods on board her which were destined for China by
way of Hong Kong. The British government objected to the pro-
'Archivs diplomatiques, 1897, t. I, p. 81. See also article by M. Diena in
Le Judgment du Conseil des prisesd'Italie dans l'affaire du Doelwijk, Journal
da Droit International Priv., t. XXIX. p. 268 (1897).
Le Conflit entre l'Italie et Abyssinia, Revue General de Droit Int. et
Priv., t. IV, p. 39 (1897), by M. Despaganot.
L'affaire du Doelwijk, Revue General de Droit int. Priv., t. IV, p. 157
(1897), by E. Brusa.
Signor Fedozzi in Revue de Droit Int., t XXIX, p. 55 (i897).
1Annuaire de 'Institut de Droit International, Vol. i5, p. 231.
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ceedings on the ground that the Gaelic had no hostile destination
and that there was no proof of any intention to call at the Chinese
port of Amoy. The incident is important as showing the attitude
of the Japanese government toward the doctrine of continuous
voyages. The case is reviewed in a note contributed by Professor
John Westlake to Takahaski's International Law during the Chino-
Japanese War.2
In this article, Westlake, who was one of the critics of the
Springbok decision,1 now states the rule in the following language:
"Goods on board a ship destined to a neutral port may be under
orders from the owners to be forwarded thence to a belligerent
port, army, or navy, either by a further voyage of the same ship,
or by trans-shipment, or even by land carriage. Such goods are
to reach the belligerent without the intervention of a new com-
mercial transaction, in pursuance of the intention formed with
regard to them by the persons who are their owners during the
voyage to the neutral port. Therefore, even during that voyage
they have a belligerent destination, although the ship which carries
them may have only a neutral one."
The latest application of the rule to which my attention has
been called was by Great Britain during the Boer War in 19o2,
when she exercised the right to search British and German vessels
bound for the Portuguese port of Lorenzo Marques with contraband
goods destined overland to the country of the Boers.
2
There is some uncertainty as to the position of the English courts.
Matters growing out of the seizure of the Peterhof have been twice
before them. Hobbs v. Hennings was an action by the owners of
a confiscated cargo on a policy of insurance. The court refused
to be bound by the findings of fact made by the Supreme Court
of the United States, and used language which has been construed
as condemning the legal grounds of the decision.1 But Dr. Philli-
'Also printed in the Law Quarterly ReviewiVol. 15, p. 23. Westlake says,
however, that the doctrine of continuous voyages has no application to block-
ade running.
'See Revue de Droit International, Vol. VII, p. 259.
'In an article on "Contraband and the American Civil War Cases," 36
Can. Law lour. (xgoa), it is said that Dr. Holland of Oxford gave an opinion
that these seizures were justified by the American cases.
'I Rob. 167.
'See 36 Can. Law four. 73 (igoo), article on "Contraband and the Ameri-
,can Civil War Cases," by Frank E Hodgins.
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more, in the last edition of his International Law,2 says that Chief
Justice Erle is in accord with the Supreme Court of the United
States, and Professor Westlake,3 says that the case "has been repre-
sented, I think, erroneously as repudiating the doctrine of continuous
voyages. * * * On the whole, then, no positive opinion is to
be found in Hobbs v. Henning on the doctrine of continuous voy-
ages, and the tendency of the court's observation is not unfavorable
to it." In the subsequent case of Seymour v. London & Provincial
Marine Insurance Co.,4 which was a similar action upon a policy
of insurance, the doctrine of continuous voyages is clearly recog-
nized and applied.
It is thus apparent that the doctrine of continuous voyages in
its modem form is well established, although it is possible that M.
Fauchille is justified in calling it a "veritable judicial anomaly."
However, that may be, it is a rule which has been adopted for the
purpose of meeting conditions which are intolerable to a belligerent,
and so firmly is the doctrine now established that we may close
this review with the remark of Professor Woolsey that, "It is
interesting to note that a theory somewhat doubtful at its origin
has been taken up from time to time and adapted to meet the
necessities of a belligerent until it is finally accepted as law by
every one. In this process of growth in the history of the doctrine
of continuous voyages, the United States has played an influential,




*Law Quart. Rev., Vol. iS, p. 28 (18g9).
'41 L. J. (N. S.) C. P. 193, affirmed in Exchequer Chamber; 42 L. J.
(N. S.) C. P. iii, note.
'Two Centuries of Growth of American Law. International Law, by
Theodore S. Woolsey, p. 503.
